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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in Nordstrom1s opening 
brief is accurate and fairly states the evidence produced at 
trial according to the requirement that this court review the 
facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. 
The undisputed facts establish that Nordstrom employed all 
three plaintiffs for an indefinite term, R. C82-5828 at 508, 
and that plaintiffs were terminable at-will employees properly 
dischargeable at any time, for any reason. Tr. Vol. V at 192. 
The issuance of the Nordstrom History, Policy and 
Regulations ("Nordstrom Manual") to the plaintiffs was not a 
part of the contractual agreement between the parties and was 
intended only as an introduction to the company for new 
employees. Tr. Vol. V, at 40. Dennis Knapp testified that the 
manuals were handed out in training sessions after new 
employees were hired. Tr. Vol. II, at 29-31. Cathy Brehany 
specifically admitted that she did not receive the manual until 
after she had been hired. Tr. Vol. II, at 123. Additionally, 
Dennis Knapp testified that the Nordstrom manual did not set 
forth the exclusive grounds or procedures for terminating 
Nordstrom employees. Tr. Vol. II, at 76. 
Nordstrom conducted a reasonable investigation to discover 
and prevent illegal drug use among employees. Tr. Vol. IV, 
106, 107-108, 110-118, 156-57, 166-168, 177, 196-197, 213-217, 
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228-229; Tr. Vol. V, 114, 117, 222-225; Tr. Vol. VI, 46-54, 
58. As outlined in Nordstrom's opening brief, after the 
investigation revealed that plaintiffs engaged in illegal drug 
use, failed to take any action to discourage drug use by 
Nordstrom employees under their supervision, or otherwise aided 
Nordstrom employees to obtain such drugs, Nordstrom discharged 
plaintiffs. Brief of Appellant, at p.8. 
Plaintiffs* statement of facts goes beyond the evidence 
produced at trial and the reasonable inferences which might be 
made therefrom to the extent that plaintiffs contend that 
Nordstrom defamed plaintiffs by recklessly communicating false 
information regarding their discharge. To the contrary, the 
record below indicates that James Nordstrom, president of 
Nordstrom, met with buyers and other management-level employees 
of the Crossroads Plaza Nordstrom store on July 20, 1981, and, 
according to most witnesses, in response to questioning, 
explained that Dennis Knapp was terminated for poor judgment 
concerning a drug-related problem. Tr. Vol. II, 109, 110, 188, 
189, 190; Vol. Ill, 96, 97, 98, 104, 205, 206. The testimony 
among plaintiffs' own witnesses was conflicting as to whether, 
in response to a further question, Mr. Nordstrom stated that 
the managers should tell their employees that Knapp1s termina-
tion had to do with drugs, or should tell them nothing at all. 
Tr. Vol. II, 189-90; Vol. Ill, 104, 179-80. The following day, 
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Darrel Hume, Dennis Knapp's replacement as general manager, 
attended another meeting of buyers and managers and, although 
there are discrepancies in the testimony, apparently stated in 
essence that Nordstrom would not tolerate the use of illegal 
drugs, and that anyone using drugs should resign. Tr. Vol. 
Ill, 98, 99, 126, 127, 133, 134; Vol. IV, 21, 22. 
ARGUMENT 
This brief addresses two major points. The brief first 
replies to plaintiffs/respondents' arguments in opposition to 
Nordstrom1s appeal. The central issue raised by Nordstrom1s 
appeal is whether the district court erred in ruling that 
plaintiffs, as indefinite term, at-will employees, had a right 
of action against Nordstrom for breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing upon being discharged. 
The brief next addresses the issues raised in plaintiffs1 
cross appeal. In their cross appeal, plaintiffs argue that the 
district court erred in dismissing their claim for wrongful 
discharge based on a breach of an implied contract, and their 
claim for defamation. 
-3-
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POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISION IN 
ROSE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT OF ACTION FOR 
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING. 
In its opening brief, Nordstrom argued that Utah law does 
not recognize a good faith exception to the at-will rule, 
citing a number of Utah cases culminating in this court's 1979 
decision in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). 
Nordstrom further argued that Utah's rejection of a good faith 
exception to the at-will rule was consistent with the majority 
of the states who have categorically refused to recognize such 
an exception. In response, plaintiffs stated that, "[t]he 
Supreme Court of Utah has never decided a case directly on 
point" on the good faith issue. Brief of Respondents, at 6. 
Since the filing of these initial briefs, however, this court 
has done exactly that in Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 
P.2d 83 (Utah 1986.). Nordstrom contends that Rose disposes of 
the good faith issue in favor of Nordstrom. 
The plaintiff in Rose was hired as an assistant manager of 
a shoe department pursuant to an oral employment agreement for 
an indefinite term. The plaintiff subsequently received rapid 
i 
promotions until he became the manager of the shoe department 
and his managerial responsibility extended to several stores. 
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Plaintiff then approached his supervisor about the possibility 
of attending school while continuing work. On two occasions 
his supervisor essentially told him that he could return to 
school and keep working so long as he met certain conditions in 
performing his job duties. The plaintiff returned to college 
and his employer subsequently received complaints about his 
work performance which eventually led to his termination. 
Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit asserting claims for breach 
of contract, promissory estoppel, contractual wrongful dis-
charge, tortious wrongful discharge, and breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id., at 84. The lower 
court subsequently granted the employer's motion for summary 
judgment after determining that the plaintiff's employment was 
"at-will." 
On appeal, this court carefully considered the nature of 
the plaintiff's employment contract for the purpose of 
determining whether it fit within one of the very limited 
exceptions to the at-will rule recognized in Bihlmaier. These 
two exceptions are: (1) whether there is an "express or 
implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment"; or 
(2) whether there is "a good consideration in addition to the 
services contracted to be rendered." Icl- at 85, citing, 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979). 
Most of this court's analysis in Rose is more directly 
relevant to the issue of the implied contract exception to the 
-5-
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at-will rule raised by plaintiffs* cross-appeal, and will, 
accordingly, be discussed in detail below. With respect to 
good faith issue, it is sufficient to note that in Rose this 
court concluded that the employee "had merely an employment 
contract of indefinite duration that could be terminated at 
will by either . . . [the employer] or . . . [the employee] 
without cause." Ijd. at 87. Significantly, because this court 
determined that the employee's contract in Rose remained 
terminable at-will, this court held that it was "not necessary 
to address the merits of the employee's other contentions." 
Id. In other words, this court concluded in Rose that because 
the plaintiff was an at-will employee, he did not have a cause 
of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and it was not even necessary to reach the issue 
of the good faith claim on appeal. 
This holding is dispositive in favor of Nordstrom on the 
good faith issue raised in this appeal. As in Rose, the 
undisputed evidence in the case at bar establishes that the 
plaintiffs were at-will employees. Plaintiffs admitted at 
trial that they were employed by Nordstrom for an indefinite 
period of time. R. C82-5828, 508. Consistent with the 
evidence, the district court below properly held with respect 
to plaintiffs' employment that: "It's an employment at-will." 
Tr. Vol. V, 192. Accordingly, because plaintiffs were at-will 
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employees, under Rose they have no cause of action for breach 
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
This court's rejection of a good faith exception to the 
at-will rule is consistent with the majority of states who have 
considered this issue. In its opening brief, Nordstrom 
discussed in detail the leading cases outlining the majority 
position rejecting a good faith exception. As set forth on 
page 21 of Nordstrom's opening brief, the majority of states 
have rejected a good faith exception for several compelling 
reasons. Nordstrom respectfully refers this court to that 
discussion and submits that its rejection of the good faith 
exception can be properly based on these same reasons. 
In its opening brief Nordstrom also discussed how the few 
states which have created an exception to the at-will rule by 
allowing recovery for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, principally New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts and California, have done so under certain 
limited circumstances which are not present in this case. In 
any event, in light of this court's recent consideration and 
rejection of the good faith exception in the Rose case, those 
few courts which have recognized a good faith exception to the 
at-will rule have taken a position contrary to the law of this 
state and, therefore, do not offer persuasive authority for 
plaintiffs' position. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS1 
CLAIMS FOR CONTRACTUAL WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 
AND DEFAMATION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
A, The Trial Court Properly Granted a Directed Verdict as 
to Plaintiffs' Contractual Wrongful Discharge Claims. 
1. Under Rose Plaintiffs Have No Actionable Claim 
for Contractual Wrongful Discharge. 
In their cross appeal, plaintiffs ask this court to reverse 
the district court's dismissal of their contractual wrongful 
discharge claim on the basis of what they allege to be an 
implied contract. Nordstrom contends that the Rose decision is 
dispositive in favor of Nordstrom on this issue as well. 
The question of whether the lower court properly dismissed 
plaintiffs' contractual wrongful discharge claim hinges upon 
whether plaintiffs had "some further express or implied stipu-
lation as to the duration of their employment." If not, each 
plaintiff's employment was nothing more than an indefinite 
general hiring terminable at the will of either party. 
Bihlmaier, supra, 603 P.2d at 792. 
Rose sets forth the standard for analyzing whether the 
plaintiffs herein had an implied stipulation as to the duration 
of employment whereby they avoid the at-will rule. As in the 
case at bar, the plaintiff in Rose was hired for an indefinite 
period and there was no written formalized agreement. 719 P.2d 
-8-
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at 83-84. The plaintiff in Rose argued, however, that his 
indefinite term, at-will employment contract "metamorphasized" 
into a contract for a definite term which could only be 
terminated for cause based on two conversations with his 
supervisor. As discussed above, the plaintiff in Rose argued 
that he understood that his job would continue while he 
attended school so long as he met certain conditions regarding 
his duties, and was entitled to rely on that understanding. 
This court rejected that argument, holding that the super-
visor's statements could not be "construed as a promise of 
continuous employment." Id. at 86. Specifically, this court 
stated that "the existence of an employment agreement not 
terminable at will must be established by more than subjective 
understandings or expectations." Ij3. The court found that 
there was no evidence that the supervisor "intended to forfeit 
his right to terminate plaintiff, any more than plaintiff 
intended to forfeit his right to terminate employment with 
. . . [the employer] if a better opportunity arose." Id. 
Additionally, this court "refused to override the at-will 
doctrine to imply a term of employment in . . . contract[s] to 
which the employer had not expressly agreed." [Emphasis 
added.] Id. at 87, explaining Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960). Based on this 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
analysis, this court held in Rose that the plaintiffs employ-
ment contract was of indefinite duration, that there were no 
express or implied stipulations to the contrary, and that the 
plaintiffs employment could be terminated at will without 
cause. Id. at 86-87. 
Applying the Rose analysis to this case, it is similarly 
clear that the plaintiffs herein were also at-will employees 
who could be terminated without cause and who have no cause of 
action for wrongful discharge based on contract. In fact, 
plaintiffs stated in their Trial Memorandum that they "were 
employed by defendant Nordstrom . . . for an indefinite term." 
R. C82-5828 at 508. This should be the end of the court's 
inquiry. 
Plaintiffs apparently take the position, however, that they 
fit within the Bihlmaier exception of an express or implied 
stipulation as to the duration of employment as the result of 
certain provisions in the Nordstrom manual and their 
participation in Nordstrom's profit sharing plan. If anything, 
Rose presents a more compelling case for the existence of an 
implied stipulation as to duration of employment than does this 
case. At least in Rose, the plaintiff relied upon specific 
conversations with his supervisor wherein the supervisor stated 
that the employee could continue working and go to school so 
long as he met certain conditions in performing his job 
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duties. In this case, there is no evidence that plaintiffs had 
any conversations with anyone in Nordstrom1s management regard-
ing the duration of their employment or certain conditions they 
had to meet for continued employment. More importantly, there 
is absolutely no evidence of any agreements or representations, 
oral or written, between the parties that plaintiffs1 employ-
ment should continue for a period of time that was either 
definite or capable of being determined. Under Rose, there-
fore, plaintiffs were at-will employees with no right of action 
upon being discharged. 
The mere fact that plaintiffs, as well as every other 
employee of Nordstrom, was offered the opportunity to 
participate in the profit sharing plan cannot be viewed as an 
implied stipulation by Nordstrom of job security or continued 
employment for any identifiable duration. The profit sharing 
plan was neither bargained for nor given in exchange for any 
promise. It was merely one of the benefits of working for 
Nordstrom; it did not create an obligation to extend employment 
terms. 
Similarly, the mere existence of the Nordstrom manual does 
not, under the standards set forth in Rose, rise to the level 
of an express or implied stipulation as to the duration of 
employment. James Nordstrom specifically testified that the 
Nordstrom manual was given to the employees for the purpose of 
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introducing them to the company. Tr. Vol. V at 40. Plaintiffs 
allege that because the manual identifies certain offenses 
which "may result in immediate dismissal" (see Exhibit P-1 at 
pp. 23-24), it gives rise to an implied agreement not to 
terminate at-will employees such as plaintiff except for cause. 
Obviously, in taking this position, plaintiffs are relying 
upon their own understanding as to the implied agreement 
arising from these provisions in the manual. Under Rose, "the 
existence of an employment agreement not terminable at will 
must be established by more than subjective understandings or 
expectations." 719 P.2d at 86. As in Rose, there is no 
evidence that Nordstrom intended to forfeit its right to 
terminate plaintiffs' employment any more than plaintiffs 
intended to forfeit their right to terminate employment with 
Nordstrom, if a better opportunity arose. In short, in this 
case, as in Rose, this court should refuse to override the 
at-will rule by implying any term of employment for plaintiffs, 
because the record contains no evidence that Nordstrom 
expressly agreed to any such term. 
2. The Nordstrom Policy Manual Does Not Create a 
Binding Employment Agreement to Terminate Only 
For Cause. 
The conclusion mandated by Rose, that the Nordstrom manual 
does not create an implied contract, is supported by the case 
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law in the majority of the states which have considered whether 
an employee handbook or manual creates an implied contract 
exception to the at-will rule. For example, several courts 
have rejected the argument advanced by plaintiffs that an 
employee handbook which states grounds or procedures for 
termination is metamorphasized into a binding employment 
contract. In Shaw v. S. S. Kresge, Co. , 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 
N.E.2d 775 (1975), an employee handbook provided that an 
employee would receive three warning notices before being 
discharged. The plaintiff there alleged that at the time of 
termination he had not received the three warning notices and 
that the handbook's provision for warning notices constituted 
the exclusive method for discharge. The court rejected that 
claim, holding that the handbook did not limit the employer's 
right to discharge the employee at-will because nowhere did the 
employer promise employment for a fixed period of time, and 
nowhere did the employee limit his right to quit work at his 
will. The handbook's provisions, therefore, did not affect the 
fact that the employment relationship could be terminated at 
the will of either party. Id.., 328 N.E.2d at 779. 
Similarly, in the recent case of Heideck v. Kent General 
Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982), an employee filed a 
wrongful discharge claim asserting that she could not be 
terminated for an offense not listed in the employment manual. 
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The employee argued that because the manual set forth a list of 
offenses for which an employee may be discharged, the employer 
thereby impliedly promised that an employee would not be 
discharged for any cause other than those listed. The Delaware 
Supreme Court rejected this claim, stating that the manual did 
not create a contract, and upheld the discharge, explaining 
that "the examples cited were not inclusive, but illustrative; 
hence, the fact that plaintiff's offense was not explicitly 
listed . . . [in the manual] is of no consequence." ^d. at 
1097. 
Both Heideck and Shaw are directly on point in this case. 
The mere fact that the Nordstrom manual unilaterally lists 
certain conduct that "may result in immediate dismissal" does 
not limit the nature of plaintiffs* at-will employment, nor 
does it create a binding agreement that Nordstrom can only 
discharge employees for the conduct listed. As in Heideck, the 
Nordstrom manual merely lists some of the reasons for which an 
employee can be dismissed. The use of the word "may" indicates 
that the examples cited are illustrative, not inclusive. 
Dennis Knapp, himself, acknowledged that manager-made policy 
regularly governed employee terminations. Specifically, Dennis 
Knapp testified that employees could be terminated for offenses 
other than those listed in the Nordstrom manual, at the 
discretion of management: 
-14-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q. Well, you knew that an employee could be fired, 
for example, for things not listed in that 
manual? (Indicating.) 
A. Each manager made their own policy, yes. 
Q. You say you as a manager could set a policy that 
even went beyond that manual where you could fire 
people; is that right? 
A. Some things that took place in stores that were 
not provided for in this manual, yes. 
Q. They were fireable offenses? 
A. If it was my opinion as the manager they were, 
yes. 
Tr. Vol. II at 76. Thus, by plaintiffs' own admission there 
was no express or implied agreement to terminate employees only 
for the grounds listed in the manual. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to support the proposition that the 
Nordstrom manual gives rise to an implied contract exception to 
the at-will rule by citing what they claim are the "most 
significant" cases which "limit and confine" the termination 
at-will doctrine. However, the primary authorities cited by 
plaintiffs do not support plaintiffs' argument because they are 
distinguishable from this case in that they involve situations 
where there were express provisions in a handbook or express 
oral representations as to job security. Obviously these are 
factors which are lacking in this case. 
For example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980), upon 
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which plaintiffs rely, the court merely enforced a right that 
arose out of a promise not to terminate except for cause. No 
such promise exists in the instant case. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Michigan recently 
clarified its holding in Toussaint as follows: 
Toussaint makes employment contracts which provide 
that an employee will not be dismissed except for 
cause enforceable in the same manner as other 
contracts. It did not recognize employment as a 
fundamental right or create a new "special" right. 
The only right held in Toussaint to be enforceable was 
the right that arose out of the promise not to 
terminate except for cause. 
Employers and employees remain free to provide, or not 
to provide, for job security. Absent a contractual 
provision for job security, either the employer or the 
employee may ordinarily terminate an employment 
contract at any time for any, or no, reason. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 
258-59, 362 N.W. 2d 628 (1984) (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, plaintiffs rely heavily on Weiner v. 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y. 2d 458, 443 N.E. 2d 441 (1982). In 
Weiner, the plaintiff was invited to enter into discussions 
with defendant's representative regarding the possibility of 
plaintiff leaving his current employment to join defendant's 
firm. During these discussions, defendant's representative 
assured plaintiff that his company's firm policy was not to 
terminate employees without "just cause," and, therefore, that 
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if he transferred his employment he would have job security. 
At the time the plaintiff signed his employment application 
with the defendant, the application further stated that his 
employment would be subject to the provisions of defendant's 
handbook, which specifically provided as follows: 
The company will resort to dismissal for just and 
sufficient cause only, and only after all practical 
steps toward rehabilitation or salvage of the employee 
have been taken and failed. 
Id. 443 N.E.2d at 442. Thus, in contrast to this case, the 
plaintiff in Weiner was relying on express oral and written 
representations regarding dismissal with cause prior to 
accepting the new employment. 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 626 P.2d 1063 
(Utah 1981), upon which plaintiffs also rely, provides no 
support for plaintiffs' argument that a personnel manual or 
handbook may give rise to a binding contract. There the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that it did not reach the issue of whether 
or not the personnel manual was binding on the employer because 
the court was bound by res judicata, since the lower court's 
decision on that issue was not appealed. 626 P.2d at 1064, 
n. 5. 
Finally, in Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97 
(Me. 1984), and in Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 
S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983), the courts in both cases held that 
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parties may enter into an employment contract terminable only 
pursuant to its express terms—as "for cause"—by clearly 
stating their intention to do so. Thus, contrary to plain-
tiffs1 position, the courts in Larrabee and in Shah stated only 
a narrow exception to the at-will rule which is limited to an 
express agreement to terminate only for cause. This, of 
course, is similar to the narrow exception stated by this court 
in Rose and, it must be emphasized, is inapplicable in this 
case because there are no clear or express promises by 
Nordstrom to employ plaintiffs for any definite period of time, 
or to terminate them for cause only. 
Finally, it is significant to note that numerous cases have 
rejected attempts to engraft employee manuals or handbooks onto 
employment contracts. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 
453 (6th Cir. 1986) is representative of these cases. In Reid, 
the Sixth Circuit held that: 
We do not believe the listing of causes that "may 
result in the termination of your employment" in the 
Sears handbook detracted in any way from the language 
in the application or . . . provided a reasonable 
basis for the conclusion that plaintiffs were employed 
under a "for cause" contract. The fact that certain 
acts were identified as conduct that might lead to 
discharge did not indicate that these acts were the 
exclusive permissible grounds for discharge. 
Significantly, the Sixth Circuit noted that, regardless of 
the reasons for discharge, the employer was within its rights 
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when it discharged an employee whose contract was terminable at 
will either with or without cause. See also, Johnson v. 
National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976) 
(wherein an employee sought to avoid the at-will rule by 
asserting that an employee handbook created an express or 
implied contract; the court held that the handbook was only a 
unilateral expression of company policies and procedures not 
bargained for by the parties that any benefits conferred by it 
were mere gratuities, and that there was no meeting of the 
minds regarding the handbook as evidenced by its unilateral 
publication by the company); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 
448 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (where the court held that 
an employee's handbook cannot be construed to be a contract; 
its purpose is to inform employees of benefits, privileges and 
corporate policies). 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiffs' 
contractual wrongful discharge claim was properly dismissed. 
The record establishes that the Nordstrom manual is a 
unilateral statement by the company, was not bargained for by 
plaintiffs, nor was it relied on by them in accepting employ-
ment because they didn't even see it until after they started 
work for Nordstrom. Tr. Vol. II, 29-31, 123. Accordingly, the 
manual cannot create a binding employment agreement. In any 
event, as shown in Nordstrom's opening brief, Nordstrom did 
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terminate plaintiffs' employment for grounds listed in the 
manual. See Brief of Appellant, at 36-39. Hence, the trial 
court's dismissal of plaintiffs' wrongful termination claim 
based on an implied contract should be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Granted a Directed Verdict as 
to Plaintiffs' Defamation Claims. 
On July 20, 1981, immediately after James Nordstrom and 
Robert Bender advised Dennis Knapp that his employment was 
terminated, they called a meeting of buyers and managers at the 
Crossroads Plaza Nordstrom store. At the meeting, 
Mr. Nordstrom announced that Knapp had been released as general 
manager and that he was to be replaced by Darrel Hume. In 
response to a question as to the reason for Knapp's termina-
tion, Mr. Nordstrom stated something to the effect that it was 
for poor judgment concerning a drug-related problem. Tr. Vol. 
II, 109, 110, 188, 189, 190; Vol. Ill, 96, 97, 98, 104, 205, 
206. 
At the meeting, someone else asked what buyers and managers 
should tell their employees. There was conflicting testimony 
as to Mr. Nordstrom's answer. As indicated in respondents' 
brief, some witnesses testified that Mr. Nordstrom said they 
i 
should tell them that it had to do with drugs. At least one of 
plaintiffs' witnesses, however, testified that Mr. Nordstrom 
< 
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expressly stated that he did not want the reasons for the 
termination discussed with employees. Tr. Vol. Ill, 179-180. 
Two other witnesses, including plaintiff Cathy Brehany at her 
deposition, had no recall of Mr. Nordstrom making any statement 
as to what the buyers and managers should tell their 
employees. Tr. Vol. II, 189-190; Vol. Ill, 104. 
The next day, July 21, 1981, after the employment of all 
three plaintiffs had been terminated, Darrel Hume, the new 
general manager, held another meeting of buyers and managers. 
At that meeting he stated that Nordstrom would not tolerate 
drug use, and that anyone using drugs should resign. Tr. Vol. 
Ill, 98, 99, 126, 127, 133, 134, Vol. IV, 21, 22. 
The above-described statements made at these two meetings 
with management-level employees are the only statements claimed 
by plaintiffs to be defamatory. On its motion for directed 
verdict, Nordstrom argued, and the trial court agreed, that the 
alleged defamatory statements were not actionable because: 
1. All statements claimed to be defamatory were 
qualifiedly privileged and are not actionable 
because there was no malice; 
2. All allegedly defamatory statements were true; and 
3. The plaintiffs' defamation claims are defeated by 
their own publication of the alleged defamatory 
statements. 
This court should affirm the trial court's directed verdict 
for the same reasons. 
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1. Defendant's Alleged Defamatory Statements Are 
Qualifiedly Privileged and Were Made Without 
Malice. 
This court should uphold the trial court's determination 
that the alleged defamatory statements were privileged and not 
actionable. Under Utah law a privileged publication is one 
made: 
In a communication, without malice, to a person 
interested therein, by one who is also interested, or 
by one who stands in such relation to the person 
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for 
supposing the motive for the communication innocent, 
or who is requested by the person interested to give 
the information. 
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(3) (1953, as amended); See also, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-506 (1953, as amended). 
This privilege is also stated in Utah case law. In Lind v. 
Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that, M[i]t has long been held that communications 
between persons who share a common business interest are qual-
ifiedly privileged and not libelous in the absence of malice." 
See also Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co. , 119 Utah 407, 228 
P.2d 272 (1951) (wherein the Utah Supreme Court adopted and 
applied this same qualified privilege); Restatement (2d) of 
Torts § 594 (1977). 
It is well-established both in Utah and in other 
jurisdictions that this qualified privilege protects an 
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employer's communication to employees, or other interested 
parties, of the reasons for an employee's discharge. See, 
e.g. , Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 
(Utah 1977) (wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that an 
employer's alleged defamatory statements made on a "blue slip" 
regarding the reasons for an employee's discharge were 
conditionally privileged); Sowell v. IML Freight, Inc., 30 Utah 
2d 446, 519 P.2d 884, 885 (1974) (wherein the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a letter from an employer's sending to a union 
a copy of a letter to an employee notifying the employee of his 
termination for reckless conduct was qualifiedly privileged as 
a communication between interested parties). 
In Deaile v. General Telephone Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841, 
115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974), a plaintiff sued a former employer 
for defamation where the employer had fired the plaintiff for 
lying about the causes for her absence from work. The employer 
subsequently communicated the reason for plaintiff's discharge 
to supervisors and operators in the facility to correct rumored 
information and to preserve employee morale and efficiency. 
The court in Deaile held that such communications are privi-
leged under a California qualified privilege statute which is 
essentially similar to Utah's, as the communications were of a 
kind reasonably calculated to protect or further a common 
interest of both the communicator and the recipients. See also 
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Kroger Co. v. Young, 210 Va. 564; 172 S.E.2d 720 (1970) 
(wherein the court held that communications of an employer to 
his employees of the reason for discharge are qualifiedly 
privileged); Ponticelli v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 104 R.I. 
549, 247 A.2d 303 (1968) (wherein the court stated that where a 
supervisor stated to a limited group of co-workers that an 
employee had been discharged for padding production figures, 
the statements were qualifiedly privileged because the super-
visor's interest in protecting his employer from being 
defrauded required that he state the reasons for the discharge 
to co-workers who might thereby be discouraged from engaging in 
similar practices); Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss. 
609, 157 So. 705 (1934) (wherein the court held that statements 
made by a distributing agent of an oil company to service 
station keepers and truck drivers that a former service station 
keeper had been discharged because of bootlegging were quali-
fiedly privileged as being a matter for consideration and 
discussion among such parties as they pertain to the success of 
the business at hand). 
Based on the foregoing authorities, this court should 
conclude as a matter of law that the statements made at the 
July 20 and 21 meetings were qualifiedly privileged, because 
Nordstrom executives made the statements only to management-
level employees, Nordstrom buyers and department managers, and 
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the statements directly concerned the conditions of employment 
or responsibilities of those buyers and department managers in 
at least the following ways: (1) the statements related to the 
replacement of their immediate supervisor, Dennis Knapp; (2) 
they related to the success of Nordstrom's business in Salt 
Lake City in which all buyers and managers and other employees 
had a direct pecuniary interest because of the company's profit 
sharing plan in which all company employees participated, and 
because increased business would enhance employees' commission 
income as well as their overall job security; and (3) they 
related to the expectations concerning the behavior of those 
buyers and managers as well as the employees they supervised, 
whose conduct was the responsibility of those buyers and 
managers, and served to discourage similar conduct among such 
employees. 
Additionally, under Utah Code Ann. § 5-2-3(3) (1953, as 
amended), statements are privileged which are made in response 
to requests for information by an interested person. 
Similarly, the Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 595 (1977), which 
is cited by plaintiffs at page 37 of their brief, states: 
(2) In determining whether a publication is within 
the generally accepted standards of decent conduct it 
is an important factor that 
(a) The publication is made in response to a 
request rather than volunteered by the publisher . . . 
-25-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The undisputed testimony at trial was that the allegedly 
defamatory statements referred to at page 3 of plaintiffs* 
brief were made in response to questions from persons present 
at the July 20 meeting at which James Nordstrom announced 
Dennis Knapp's discharge. That Mr. Nordstrom's allegedly 
defamatory statements were made in response to questions gives 
further weight to the conclusion that those statements were 
privileged, and should be given considerable latitude. 
The case of Haddad v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 526 F.2d 83 
(6th Cir. 1976), which is relied on heavily by plaintiffs in 
their brief for the proposition that the conditional privilege 
does not arise in the instant case, is contrary to the weight 
of authority cited above and is also distinguishable factually 
from the case at bar. In Sears, the court based its holding on 
the fact that the defamatory statements were made to non-
managerial employees. While Nordstrom does not concede that 
the privilege should not apply when statements are made under 
such circumstances, here there is no dispute that the state-
ments at issue were made to managerial employees of Nordstrom, 
and therefore are privileged even under the Sears case. 
As the alleged defamatory statements were qualifiedly 
privileged, plaintiffs can prevail on their defamation claim 
only if they established that the statements were made with 
malice. Traditionally, the Utah courts have stated that the 
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malice necessary to overcome a conditional privilege is 
improper motive, such as desire to do harm, or that the 
defendant did not honestly believe his statements to be true, 
or that the publication was excessive. Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, 
Inc. , 551 P.2d 222, 225 (Utah 1976). However, in the more 
recent case of Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 
1981), the Utah Supreme Court stated that a qualified privilege 
can only be overcome by proof of "actual malice," and that the 
burden of proving actual malice is on the plaintiff. 16. at 
976 and n.5, citing, Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing 
Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933). 
In Seegmiller, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "actual 
malice" is defined to mean "a deliberate misrepresentation or a 
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement." 
626 P.2d at 971, citing, New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). The court 
also noted that a "reckless disregard for truth" is defined as 
follows: 
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a 
reasonably prudent man would have published, or would 
have investigated before publishing. There must be 
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts 
shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and 
demonstrates actual malice. 
626 P.2d at 972, citing, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 
731, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1968). 
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Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in St. Amant 
v. Thompson, supra, held that a plaintiff in a defamation 
action failed to establish reckless disregard for truth even 
where the defendant had made defamatory statements about the 
plaintiff and the defendant had no personal knowledge of the 
plaintiff's activities, had relied solely on a third-party 
affidavit even though the record was silent as to the third 
party's reputation for veracity, had failed to verify the 
information with those who might have known the true facts, and 
had given no consideration as to whether his statements would 
defame the plaintiff. The Supreme Court further defined the 
concept of "reckless disregard for the truth" as follows: 
[The] mere proof of failure to investigate, 
without more, cannot establish reckless disregard 
for the truth, rather, the publisher must act 
with a "high degree of awareness of . . . 
probable falsity." 
Gertz v, Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 
41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 801 (1974). 
The evidence at trial clearly established that the state-
ments made at the July 20 and 21 meetings were made without 
actual malice. The reference to drugs in the statements were 
based on an investigation made by defendants in which several 
individuals reported, and at least two persons specifically 
confirmed, that the plaintiffs were involved in drug-related 
-28-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
activities. Based on the information James Nordstrom received, 
one cannot determine that he acted with a reckless disregard 
for the truth or entertained serious doubt as to statements 
made at the July 20 meeting. Even Dennis Knapp testified that 
he had had a close relationship with James Nordstrom prior to 
his termination, that Mr. Nordstrom expressed remorse to him 
about the termination, and that in times prior Mr. Nordstrom 
had also spoken highly of Cathy Brehany. Tr., Vol. II, 85-86. 
Darrel Hume did not even call the July 21 meeting. Tr. 
Vol. VII, 7. It was set up before he arrived in Salt Lake 
City. Id. His statement was nothing more than a reiteration 
of Nordstrom*s policy that employees should refrain from use of 
illegal drugs. 
In sum, Nordstrom* s actions were taken in what was 
perceived as the best interest of the company. James Nordstrom 
terminated Dennis Knapp*s employment because he had made poor 
decisions regarding the people that worked for him which could 
have brought strong negative reflection upon Nordstrom in the 
Salt Lake area. Even under the traditional malice standard, 
there is absolutely no evidence that the allegedly defamatory 
statements were made with any ill will or desire to do harm to 
plaintiffs. Contrary to plaintiff's claims of excessive publi-
cation, the statements were brief, restrained, not volunteered 
and were made to only a selected group of management level 
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employees at the Crossroads Plaza store. Certainly, under the 
circumstances, no malice can be imputed to Nordstrom. 
This court should determine that Cathy Brehany's defamation 
claim was properly dismissed on the further ground that 
Brehany's Amended Complaint failed to even raise the issue of 
malice, much less plead any specific facts which would tend to 
support a claim of malice. R. C82-5828, 109-110. In Lind v. 
Lynch, supra, 665 P.2d at 1279, the Utah Supreme Court indi-
cated that where the qualified privilege applies, if no issue 
of malice is raised in the pleadings, the trial court could 
properly grant a motion for summary judgment on a defamation 
claim. See also, Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1976), 
(where the court held that a complaint charging defendants with 
conduct that was reckless, willful, wanton, malicious, unlawful 
and grossly negligent, was not sufficient to allege malice when 
there was no evidentiary facts pled in the complaint to support 
the legal conclusion of maliciousness). 
The allegedly defamatory statements having been condition-
ally privileged, and made without malice, the trial court's 
directed verdict was properly granted. In addition, Brehany's 
failure to even plead malice further justifies the dismissal of 
her defamation claim. 
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2. All Alleged Defamatory Statements Made by Defendants 
Were True. 
Truth is a complete defense to the allegedly defamatory 
statements made at the July 20 and 21 meetings. Ogden Bus 
Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976). The Utah Supreme 
Court has recently reaffirmed that a party can avail itself of 
the defense of truth to a defamation claim if the defamatory 
statement is true in substance. Specifically, the Court stated 
as follows: 
To establish the defense of truth, "it is not neces-
sary to prove the literal truth of the precise state-
ment made. Insignificant inaccuracies of expression 
are immaterial, providing that the defamatory charge 
is true in substance." 
Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290-91 (Utah 1984), 
citing Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 127, 247 P.2d 264, 266 
(1952). 
The allegedly defamatory statements in this case constitute 
at most nothing more than general statements that plaintiffs' 
terminations were related to drugs. The plaintiffs' own admis-
sions at trial demonstrate that each of them had involvement 
with drugs. 
Dennis Knapp admitted to using both marijuana and cocaine 
while a Nordstrom employee. He also admitted to seeing or 
being aware of several of his managerial employees using 
illegal drugs while he was general manager in Utah, and that he 
did nothing to discourage their drug use. 
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Barbara Knapp admitted to using illegal drugs frequently 
while employed by Nordstrom. Cathy Brehany admitted regularly 
being in the presence of a number of her friends and associates 
while they used drugs, and that she offered to arrange for four 
of her friends to obtain cocaine from an acquaintance of hers, 
Jody Bernafo, whom she understood to be a regular user of 
cocaine. 
This evidence provides a further basis for affirming the 
trial court's directed verdict. 
3. Plaintiffs' Defamation Claim is Defeated by 
Plaintiffs' Publication of the Alleged Defamatory 
Statements. 
An essential element in a defamation claim is that the 
defendants publish or communicate the defamatory matter. Utah 
Code Ann. § 45-2-2 (1953, as amended); Restatement (2d) of 
Torts, § 558 (1977). 
In Church of Scientology of California, Inc. v. Green, 354 
F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court held that: 
There is no publication if the defamatory statement is 
exposed to a third party by the person claiming to be 
defamed . . . . 
Id. at 804 (citations omitted). See also, Shoemaker v. 
Friedberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 911, 183 P.2d 318 (1947); Kemper v. 
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. 
Ohio 1973). 
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In the instant case, plaintiffs admit they repeatedly pub-
lished to numerous Nordstrom employees and others the defama-
tory statements which they alleged defendants made. Dennis 
Knapp admitted telling several co-employees even before his 
termination that he was going to be discharged for drug use. 
Tr., Vol. II, 59-62. Likewise, Cathy Brehany testified that on 
the day she was fired she told several employees of the Salt 
Lake City and downtown Seattle Nordstrom stores that she had 
been accused of drug involvement and shortly thereafter told 
several others the same thing. Tr. Vol. II, 193-98. Accord-
ingly, plaintiffs cannot now claim that Nordstrom is respon-
sible for publication of defamatory statements regarding them. 
Moreover, any damages allegedly suffered by plaintiffs would be 
speculative, because it would be impossible to determine 
whether plaintiffs were in fact damaged by defendants' alleged 
publication or by their own publication of the allegedly 
defamatory statements. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and Nordstrom's opening brief, this 
court should reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment 
favoring plaintiffs and against Nordstrom, and affirm the trial 
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court's directed verdict on plaintiffs' contractual wrongful 
discharge and defamation claims. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stanle^K Preston 
Attorneys for Appellant/ 
Cross-Respondent 
SCMSJH1 
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